Skepticism does not seem to matter in all cases.

[inator]

I'm only saying that the same type of interest (same weight) in different beings could be conceptually equal

Why would you presume this at all? And where do you draw the line between types?

Why presume they're not equal when similar biological functions result in similar interests?

I have three containers, A, B and C

Container A contains 30% sugar and 70% salt. Container B contains 50% salt and 50% sugar. Container C contains 5% salt, 5% sugar, and 90% sand.

This is the same kind of information you're talking about when you can weigh interests against themselves internally (e.g. that one values one thing twice as much as another), and count them in terms of total quantity of different kinds of interest (something I don't agree with).

The interest of a human to feed may be lower in relative terms than that of a bird - because a human has more potential interests to weigh the feeding against.
But in absolute terms, the interest to feed should be equal - and the size of the containers (sum total of interests) is not equal.

Individual A has an 80% interest to feed, 10% interest to procreate and 10% interest to avoid pain.
Individual B can have different percentages for those three interests if you add at least one more interest (say the interest to be around other individuals of the same species). B then has a 5% interest to be social, 76% (95% x 80) interest to feed, 9,5% interest to procreate and 9,5% interest to avoid pain.
In absolute terms, B will have a greater sum total of interests, but the same amount/magnitude for each of the interests it shares with A.

You may say that a wolf has a higher magnitude of the interest to form relationships than other less social animals do. But that would be like saying that an elephant has a higher interest to feed, because he needs more calories.
I'd say that, once the interest exists, the elephant has the same interest to feed as much as biology requires of him.

Which should lead me to conclude that each sentient creature has the same interest to satisfy its biological needs, whatever those may be.

But some animals have developed greater abilities to satisfy those basic needs, because environmental factors have challenged them more.
Even if the practical function of those abilities is removed in environments where they're not challenged as much anymore, the interest to use those abilities can be retained (like the ability to enjoy pleasure, even though the incentive value of pleasure is gone; or the ability to draw for drawing's sake, not for communication/cooperation).
So now the highly sentient being has more interests than the simple need to fulfill its biological needs.

I suppose you could talk of higher magnitude of interest with higher magnitude of potential ability, but only if the magnitude of that initial interest to satisfy biological needs is equal.

Is this wasp more sentient than Bob? It has more interests, of more varying types.
You can't even categorize the nest building, mating, catching spiders, and laying eggs on them under an umbrella interest of reproduction because the wasp doesn't even understand the concept.

Maybe the wasp fulfills all of the interests that it can have based on its sentience. Whereas Bob, based on his sentience, has a lot of potential to have a number of other interests.
Those lacking interests are not as necessary for satisfying his biological needs like the wasp's are, because he lives in a confortable environment that doesn't require him to put all of his abilities to the test in order to survive. So he doesn't feel compelled to develop them.

A painter has the interest to make paintings and puts his effort into that, and ignores his 'ability' to have the interest of coding in Python. But he has that potential to some degree too. The wasp has little potential beyond the interests that it already fulfills.

You may be put in the uncomfortable position of valuing certain insects over human beings, in that case.

Not if you look at ability to have interests.

It's your altruism that puts you in the difficult position of valuing an insect's life over your own (on an island, where outside consequences don't matter).

You mean novel interests which humans have but others don't? Like what?

Is there any interest humans possess that you can qualify as a novel type, completely new and different from that of other species?

Maybe the interest to create for creativity's sake? I'm not exactly sure to what extent other primates would be able to do that.

I wouldn't be opposed to talking of magnitude instead of novel type of interest if the interest to satisfy similar biological needs isn't considered to be different in itself purely based on variing levels of sentience.