Philosophical Vegan Forum

Jebus wrote:

Soycrates wrote:[
Seeing the individual and collective benefits of veganism and developing laws that punish non-vegan behaviour is an act of ethical conduct. It doesn't need to be carried out because each and every person empathizes with animals; empathy is not the only form of morality and morality is not just a matter of emotion or sentiment. Morality is also about justice and reason. All of the above traits are those which would be more reasonable and more just actions, meaning they're absolutely about intelligence and morality. Whether they're done out of reasoned pragmatism or a strong, objective sense of right or wrong doesn't make it any more or less a moral issue.

A moral action to me is simply one that in no way benefits yourself (or those close to you) and which benefits a person or animal with whom you may never have any contact. As any law that punishes non-vegan behavior would directly benefit the proponents of that law, I have a hard time seeing how this could be an example of morality.

Then it seems like, for you, morality doesn't exist. The actions we take to benefit others almost always provide some benefit to ourselves: sometimes it just makes us happier, sometimes it improves our health, sometimes it improves our own habitat. If moral actions are ones that in no way benefit yourself, you're going to have a hard time finding moral actions. Which is why these are usually called altruistic actions, not moral ones. Morality is a term used to normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons. That can absolutely benefit yourself, but it can't solely benefit yourself, and it's usually not self-oriented.

Jebus wrote:A moral action to me is simply one that in no way benefits yourself (or those close to you) and which benefits a person or animal with whom you may never have any contact.

That is a very narrow conception of morality. All that is right/good is moral, that is very broad. What you're describing is altruism, but even for that it's too narrow. There is no word for what you're describing I guess, but altruism gets closest.

Jebus wrote: A moral action to me is simply one that in no way benefits yourself (or those close to you) and which benefits a person or animal with whom you may never have any contact.

'Benefit' is too broad and may be interpreted in different ways without clarifying. Maybe you mean Materially benefit.

Jebus wrote: As any law that punishes non-vegan behavior would directly benefit the proponents of that law, I have a hard time seeing how this could be an example of morality.

And now you're using 'benefit' in a very strange way. How would that law benefit its proponents, unless the legislation was packed with pork to line the pockets of its advocates?

The law would only indirectly benefit its proponents by protecting animals and benefiting a principle those proponents value. That's about as immaterial as it gets.

If you value morality, then doing something moral benefits those values, and you might say that by valuing morality it's impossible to be moral. See the problem there?

The thing is, in so far as the illusion of free-will carries, we choose who we are, and we choose what to value. Deciding to be a good person instead of a bad one is part of that. It benefits us existentially, but all the same, if we decided to be bad people we could be benefited by something else (like torturing small animals and stealing candy from children) all the same.

It's unfortunate that so many otherwise interesting discussions get derailed because of semantic disagreements.

Jebus wrote:It's unfortunate that so many otherwise interesting discussions get derailed because of semantic disagreements.

Most discussions ARE semantic disagreements at heart.

Language is both about communication, and about meaning, the latter being the most philosophically relevant.

What does good mean? What does god mean? The very definitions of these things define their outcomes.
If every word were perfectly defined and everybody agreed on those definitions, there would probably be nothing left to argue about.

Semantics are extremely important. Why does anyone say "Oh, that's just semantics"? If you cannot agree on the usage of key words in a discussion, you can't have that discussion.

Soycrates wrote:If you cannot agree on the usage of key words in a discussion, you can't have that discussion.

Not only can you not have the discussion, you can't even think the same things.

Words are not just how we communicate, but language is also the medium with which we think (I agree with Dennett on this point). A different vocabulary means thinking in a different way, just as different tools lead us to solve problems differently, for better or worse. Possessing and understanding words in the right way can be the difference between irrationality and rationality.

Word meanings, and the meanings of the concepts attached to those words, are the most important thing in philosophy.

Although, if you agree on all of the words in a discussion, I don't think there would be anything to discuss anymore. Every philosophical argument is in some sense a semantic one. Without disagreement of some term or concept hiding somewhere in the issue, there's probably no possibility for disagreement between rational people.

brimstoneSalad wrote:Words are not just how we communicate, but language is also the medium with which we think (I agree with Dennett on this point). A different vocabulary means thinking in a different way, just as different tools lead us to solve problems differently, for better or worse.

Have you read Steven Pinker's work? He argued in The Language Instinct that we really think in concepts, and language is a tool to represent those concepts. Other languages use words that have different or deviating concepts, and that will lead you to think in other concepts, but on the level of having thoughts you aren't thinking in a language. I don't want to go into the details because I may misrepresent Pinker (it's some time ago that I read about it), but I think Pinker's explanation makes a lot more sense.

Volenta wrote:Have you read Steven Pinker's work? He argued in The Language Instinct that we really think in concepts, and language is a tool to represent those concepts. Other languages use words that have different or deviating concepts, and that will lead you to think in other concepts, but on the level of having thoughts you aren't thinking in a language. I don't want to go into the details because I may misrepresent Pinker (it's some time ago that I read about it), but I think Pinker's explanation makes a lot more sense.

I wonder if the non-Dutch people here have a concept of gezelligheid.

For those of you who are those people; gezellig is a Dutch word that does not translate very well into English (or any other language that I know of). Here's what Wikipedia has to say about it:

“A perfect example of untranslatability is seen in the Dutch language through the word gezellig, which does not have an English equivalent.

Literally, it means cozy, quaint, or nice, but can also connote time spent with loved ones, seeing a friend after a long absence, or general togetherness.”

Volenta wrote: He argued in The Language Instinct that we really think in concepts, and language is a tool to represent those concepts. Other languages use words that have different or deviating concepts, and that will lead you to think in other concepts, but on the level of having thoughts you aren't thinking in a language.

That sounds potentially accurate, although of course it's hard to talk about metacognition.

I see advanced concepts as only realistically capable of being built by using the abstraction of language, though once built they may be able to be comprehended on their own; it's really just a pointer in the brain, whether accessed through the lookup table of language, or more directly.