Law of excluded middle

[Cirion Spellbinder]

My English may be lacking, but I think (?) that I expressed what I wanted to express. What's not clear?

Most I'm confused about the use of the word paradigm. Isn't a paradigm (and I Googled to verify) an example of a theory or pattern? So when you say:

Vague in the sense it seems paradoxical relying on induction, but defending paradigms of the theory at the same time.

does that mean "you cannot defend induction and paradigms of induction without an apparent contradiction?" Otherwise, I'm not sure what is meant and I'm not confident in my first interpretation

What do you mean?

When you say:

There are no clear criterions when the theory really collapses, or just needs to be refined.

does that mean there are no clear criterions for when induction itself collapses or when a theory upholding its facts on the basis of induction collapses?

Better, the theory with epicycles was more adequate than Copernican with circular orbits. Furthermore, there were observations that contradicted implications of the Copernican theory.

Isn't that just an issue of better observations to inductively reason from? If two groups of twenty speculate about what lies on the top of a mountain, one from a kilometer away from the base of the mountain and the other from atop the mountain, we wouldn't consider either a failure of induction, just a failure of the precision proceeding the induction about the mountain's peak.

[Cirion Spellbinder]

Is there anything that didn't make sense to you in my explanation?

I'm going to first try to summarize what of your position I do understand:

• The natural language is plagued with ambiguities that don't need to be reflected by logic

• MWI conserves logical determinism

• Metaphysical axioms are favored by Occam's razor than logical axioms because the former can be deduced from empirical science, while the latter cannot

Then I will ask about what I don't understand:

• What is wrong with modal logic?

[brimstoneSalad]

Then I will ask about what I don't understand:

• What is wrong with modal logic?

Nothing is wrong with modal logic as an optional extension of classical logic for situations where you don't want to get bogged down in metaphysics.
Kind of how there's nothing wrong with using Newtonian physics when it's appropriate. It can be a good tool.

It's just not a requirement for dealing with these issues, and there's no reason to believe it better represents an underlying reality than classical logic (to the contrary, due to Occam's razor, classical logic should be preferred).

I just have a problem with the accusations I feel are being made against classical logic.

The problem, in terms of usage for morality etc., is that we can't assert that the conclusions of modal logic are true of reality when there's no metaphysical justification for considering things like probability real in the first place.

[mkm]

@brimstoneSalad

It does, actually; it matters a great deal. If you don't understand why it matters if something is real or not, I don't know what to tell you.

I slowly start thinking you misunderstand me on purpose, especially considering that you cut the part where I explain precisely why and in what meaning it doesn't matter. So, let's bring skipped part

It doesn't matter whether these universes are "real", "actualized", or some other meaningless (physiacally) statement. it's just a way of talking about this and the way we talk about this doesn't change whether these universes actually exist or not.

It's the same thing with discussing the existence of God. It doesn't matter whether he exists or he doesn't, If we don't know it, our discussions on the topic remain the same. For you as an atheist, would your reasoning change, if God would really exist, but everybody still would have the same data to make their minds?

If you want to call it "isomorphic" because it serves a similar function, that's fine, but it isn't the same thing. A bird and a bat aren't the same thing because they both fly either.

No, they don't just serve similar function. One can be translated into the other while preserving the structure. For all purposes it's the same thing.

It's like the "God of the Gaps"

No, these are limitations for experimental sciences. The fact that some unobservables make it easier for us to think about something doesn't mean that these unobservables are real. You may assume that they are, ot they are not, but that assumptions is not necessary, so you can drop it, and Occam's razor agrees.
You confuse models and their semantics with the reality.

What is solidly in the domain of metaphysics today is the physics of tomorrow. It's also debatable at the fringes; like QM interpretations.

Call me when they find experimental way to confirm realness of these universes, I will gladly change my mind then. Right now physicists disagree or don't care about realness of these worlds, and it doesn't affect their "performance". It's useful way of thinking and assuming realness of these things gives you nothing.

Axioms, on the other hand, can not be challenged.

Again, just your opinion. Axioms were and are challenged, especially when we try model the reality with mathematical structures and we fail.

Which is the whole point of the metaphysical premises.
Unless you deny that MWI is deterministic, or deny its validity, you have no leg to stand on in criticizing classical logic to be incapable of dealing with modal statements because there's no reason to believe such statements represent reality.

There all the same reasons to believe so: we want to, its elegant, it's good semantics for the theory.

Exercise in futility: show how "breakdown in classical logic" using premises on existence of universes differs from answering "maybe", assuming that underlying logic is modal.

What you're doing is like criticizing geometry for being incapable of dealing with square circles. Maybe it doesn't deal with those things because those things are invalid by their very nature? Maybe that's OK that it ignores nonsense like that.

If you call future contingents square circles, you have more problems than me
I see it more more like criticizing the use of classical geometry to the relativity.

Which is what makes your arguments non-credible. You're throwing in axioms arbitrarily without substantiating them.

You wish. There is nothing more arbitrary in assuming modal logic than classical logic, and I pointed out some benefits of this approach.

I explained how this is not acceptable to Occam's razor. I don't know how else to explain this.

You did not. You repeatedly claimed, that Occam's razor favors metaphysical premises over axioms, but you based it on your personal preferences to change metaphysical premises rather than axioms. It's not how Occam's razor work, or it doesn't matter here, since Occam's razor is not the law of logic anyway, just "economically" useful tool to not overcomplicate theories. You could try to show how assuming modal logic is more complicated than the classical logic with additional premises, but you would fail, since number of assumptions is the same.

I understand how you think it's subjectively cumbersome, and I explained how in practice even something inaccurate like Newtonian physics can have advantages. I'm not sure what else I can say. Adding axioms does not mean those axioms are essential to logic. I understand that they can work, but it doesn't mean they represent reality, which leaves the whole argument begging the question based on the additional axioms being asserted.

I fail to see and you fail to make your case how additional metaphysical premises equivalent to "modal logic models statements about the reality" don't beg the questions, but for some reason assuming modal logic does.

It's better to solve problems with premises than by re-writing logic.

Personal preference.

If you have to deal with assessing something somebody is saying about a square circle, the solution isn't to add on a bunch of ad hoc rules to 2d geometry that aren't substantiated. Sometimes it's as simple as saying "square circles as 2d shapes don't exist, but here's a cylinder: it's a circle in one plane and a square in another." Geometry already deals with a sort of square circle as long as they're in different planes as part of a 3d shape. No need to rewrite geometry on account of somebody who doesn't understand that (which is basically what you're trying to do with logic here, for those who don't metaphysically understand probability).

I know you realize, that for example geometry was rewritten to fit the theory of relativity, so I don't know why you produced this nonsense. Not that there are no "square circles", for example if you change Euclidean metric to metric "maximum". But oh shit, I've just rewritten geometry and work in metric spaces! And again, my goal was to keep future contingents like "tomorrow will be a sea battle" or "I will go shopping tomorrow" sensible, and modal logic does just that. And you came and say that they are "square circles". My claim on the superiority of modal logic is exactly here - it preserves greater chunk of statements in natural language and the classical logic make some of them "square circles".

Do you understand how it's a violation of Occam's razor to assert additional axioms when they're not necessary?

Just like adding premises. And?

But you can do it within classical logic. You don't need to go Modal.

But it's more elegant in the way I described.

Which is why, in asserting more axioms, you're violating Occam's razor by claiming things about modal logic's relationship to reality when classical logic would suffice. It's not substantiated.

Do you realize, that the classical logic isn't a model for natural language and the reality by default? Maybe that's our problem.

It does the same job in some respects, but that doesn't make it philosophically identical. If you don't understand that, then there's nothing I can do to explain it to you.
It's what I see as your assertion of the supremacy of modal logic and the inferiority of classical logic that I take issue with.

What does it mean "philosophically identical"? Can things be identical, but not philosophically identical and vice versa?

@Cirion Spellbinder

Most I'm confused about the use of the word paradigm. Isn't a paradigm (and I Googled to verify) an example of a theory or pattern? So when you say:

Vague in the sense it seems paradoxical relying on induction, but defending paradigms of the theory at the same time.

does that mean "you cannot defend induction and paradigms of induction without an apparent contradiction?" Otherwise, I'm not sure what is meant and I'm not confident in my first interpretation

By paradigms I meant assumptions for some theory in physics, beyond basic metaphysical assumptions. A sequence of observations successfully confirming (or rather not contradicting) observations) makes you believe in the theory more, but one observation can shutter it. The paradox is that you should also defend your theory in spite of contradictory observations.

When you say:

There are no clear criterions when the theory really collapses, or just needs to be refined.

does that mean there are no clear criterions for when induction itself collapses or when a theory upholding its facts on the basis of induction collapses?

The second one, I don't poke induction principle itself now.

Isn't that just an issue of better observations to inductively reason from? If two groups of twenty speculate about what lies on the top of a mountain, one from a kilometer away from the base of the mountain and the other from atop the mountain, we wouldn't consider either a failure of induction, just a failure of the precision proceeding the induction about the mountain's peak.

That exactly was the case. But what do you do, if there are no better observations for 100 years?

[brimstoneSalad]

Obviously it matters if something is real or not.
If you don't think it does, that's your problem, not mine.

I slowly start thinking you misunderstand me on purpose,

Now you're just irritating me.
This conversation is over, I'm not responding to the rest of your post.

I don't misunderstand you, and certainly not intentionally. If you've communicated poorly that's on you.

Cirion seems to understand my point, so I can presume most reading do. If you don't see the difference between something being assumed to be real or not, that's your problem and I don't think I can help you. It's not just how we talk about things, it's the existential assumptions we're making. That may not matter in a mathematical sense, and for some reason you may not care about it, but it does when we relate it back to reality and it's very relevant to ethics and public discourse and understanding.

[Cirion Spellbinder]

@brimstoneSalad
I just realized I have a question: how do we know moral propositions have truth values unlike sentences like “this sentence is false”?

[brimstoneSalad]

@brimstoneSalad
I just realized I have a question: how do we know moral propositions have truth values unlike sentences like “this sentence is false”?

That would depend on your position with respect to the relevant questions of moral realism.

Did you read this article? wiki/index.php/Objective-subjective_distinction
One of the images is a handy flow chart.

Probably a better question for another (new?) thread. Although we can say that if there's no reason to have confidence in logic, the logical conclusions we make following from premises about morality hold no water (I don't think that answers your question).

[mkm]

@brimstoneSalad

That was... unexpected. I'll take your words seriously and try not to discuss things further, let me just leave some closing thoughts then, since your post leaves an impression, that I carry some convictions to carrying which I don't admit.

Obviously it matters if something is real or not.
If you don't think it does, that's your problem, not mine.

I explained precisely for which purposes it doesn't matter. If you have a rebuttal, bring it on, don't stick labels on me, which are not accurate. If these things are obvious, then you shouldn't have problems with explaining it.

I don't misunderstand you, and certainly not intentionally. If you've communicated poorly that's on you.

The communication would be more efficient if you didn't ignore my arguments and just quote parts which are easy to turn into straw man of my argument.

Cirion seems to understand my point, so I can presume most reading do. If you don't see the difference between something being assumed to be real or not, that's your problem and I don't think I can help you. It's not just how we talk about things, it's the existential assumptions we're making. That may not matter in a mathematical sense, and for some reason you may not care about it, but it does when we relate it back to reality and it's very relevant to ethics and public discourse and understanding.

I understand your point, I just happen to disagree. I'm not sure why it's a problem. It's you who claim some things, that you are unable to prove. I get that most people are so rooted in some version of "hard" realism, that they have no issues with these assumptions. I just point out that they are not obvious and we can't talk sense when we try to substantiate them. See our discussion with Cirion about induction principle for example. You can't prove it's right, it's useful, but it doesn't make assuming that rule obvious.

Thanks for the discussion anyway.

• MWI conserves logical determinism

That's inaccurate. MWI is deterministic in the sense that systems never break superposition and with each event (observation?) that may have multiple outcomes the system splits into subsystems that are all in superposition as well, but evolve independently, or in other words, universe splits into universes with these outcomes, so all outcomes hold at the same time. Technically it's determinism, but the answer to "tomorrow will be a sea battle" is still "in some universes yes, and in some no" or "yes and no" due to not broken superposition of all states. I don't know how about you, but I don't "see" all outcomes of all splits of all times, just the branch in which I happen to sit, and MWI says nothing about to which split you will belong (though, as a unexceptional part of the universe you end up in all in superposition, but it doesn't help and I don't know what does it mean).

[brimstoneSalad]

@mkm I don't have time to deal with a one sided discussion where somebody is assuming bad faith on my part.
I'm trying to be brief.

People spend too much time worrying about whether reality is "real" or not, and it's not useful.

Cirion: "MWI conserves logical determinism"
mkm: "That's inaccurate." [...] "Technically it's determinism,"

So it's not inaccurate, it's just lacking the confusing nuance you want:

"I don't "see" all outcomes of all splits of all times, just the branch in which I happen to sit, and MWI says nothing about to which split you will belong (though, as a unexceptional part of the universe you end up in all in superposition, but it doesn't help and I don't know what does it mean)."

What does any of that mean? You don't even know.
Obviously YOU do see all of them, just not the same you, because YOU ARE in all of them (except the ones you're dead in). If you don't know what it means, why are you telling people what they're saying is inaccurate? Not cool.

I feel like your criticism exceeds your grasp here. Can you see how this can't be productive? And that when you're sliding in subtle insults and accusing other people of not understanding your position (as you did with me) when you clearly don't understand it yourself, it's basically the opposite of productive?

[Cirion Spellbinder]

That would depend on your position with respect to the relevant questions of moral realism.

What is your position?

Did you read this article? http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/inde ... istinction
One of the images is a handy flow chart.

I have, but I didn't look at the chart. It seems I'm a non-naturalist?

Probably a better question for another (new?) thread. Although we can say that if there's no reason to have confidence in logic, the logical conclusions we make following from premises about morality hold no water (I don't think that answers your question).

But I don't think most people outright reject logic (unless they don't know what it is)?