Objection To FreeWill arguments
Posted: Sun May 18, 2014 1:39 am
This is my objection to arguments that hold people accountable to their God via free will.
I don't quite even understand free will, but I will still argue against it. So I guess I should give a sort of definition. I will argue against any free will definition that implies this: the choices we make hold us accountable to some sort of Abrahamic God. So of course I will accept by fiat that there is some sort of Abrahamic God, and he has the sort of properties that are common of the variations of Abrahamic Gods like omnipotence, omniscience, benevolence and some sort of heaven and hell system.
Alright lets get to my objection. First I argue choice is dependent on at least four different factors of circumstances. For now I say they are environment, knowledge, physical condition, and motivation. For instance I could not choose to type on the computer this moment if I did not have a computer in front of me, so the environment is sufficient for typing at the computer to be an option of choice. I could not choose to type at this computer if I had no idea how to access this computer, so my knowledge is sufficient for typing at the computer to be an option of choice for me. I could not choose to type at this computer at the moment if I had no arms, and nothing to accommodate me, so my physical condition is sufficient for typing at the computer to be an option of choice for me. I could not choose to type at this computer If I had no reason or desire to do so, so my motivation is sufficient for typing at the computer to be an option of choice for me. The last one might be a little iffy at first so I will try to drive home this condition. I have a lot of knowledge of what might kill me, and my environment is such that I have access to lots of things that could kill me. My physical condition is also capable of causing myself death. So, why don't I choose to kill myself? Because I have more motivation to choose other options, like continuing to live. Those are the four main things choice is dependent on that I can think of right now.
Next knowledge, motivation, physical condition and environment are all influenced by each other. We get our motivation, and knowledge from our environment and physical condition. Also, our environment and physical condition are set at first but through knowledge and motivation and other circumstances they can also change and so our choices available to us and our ability to choose those choices constantly change.
So that being the case we are limited in choice to these factors, and choices will be ever changing when these factors change. So I will argue that either there is some sort of combination of circumstances of environment, knowledge, physical condition, and or motivation in some possible world that will lead a specific person to believe in god yet still keep whatever it is that still makes that person that person, whether it be soul or personality or character, ect. or there is not.
Option one: There is a possible world where circumstances are such that a non-believing person would believe in God and still be the same person. If that is the case then couldn't God make these worlds for everyone?
Option two: There is no such possible world under any circumstance where a non-believing person can believe in God and still be the same person. Then where is the freewill there? It seems that some people are made to disbelieve regardless of circumstance.
With that in mind how could such a God with the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and benevolence make a world where some people are limited by their circumstances and unable to believe and others are not. How could a God such like that condemn people that would have believed under different circumstances?
How could I be held accountable by God if God knows what worlds I would believe in him or not and he puts me in one he knew would be insufficient for me to believe? If God could not put me in any world of belief sufficient circumstances then how could I be held accountable to God if no matter what happened in my life in any possible world I would sin? Therefore If God has the properties I described and choice is as I described I cannot be held accountable by God for my disbelief.
Under this God's given properties and my analysis of choice freewill does not exist.
Note this is not really a direct argument from determinism because there could be many different worlds that would lead to a belief in god some far more likely than others. This is just an argument from the analysis of what choice is dependent on and the properties of an abrahmic God.
This has been an argument floating in my head for a while but I never really cared to take the time to flush it out. What do you think? Is it decent? Does it avoid the attacks arguments from determinism gets? Can I add something more to it? Anything need clarification? What are some possible counter arguments. Thanks.
I don't quite even understand free will, but I will still argue against it. So I guess I should give a sort of definition. I will argue against any free will definition that implies this: the choices we make hold us accountable to some sort of Abrahamic God. So of course I will accept by fiat that there is some sort of Abrahamic God, and he has the sort of properties that are common of the variations of Abrahamic Gods like omnipotence, omniscience, benevolence and some sort of heaven and hell system.
Alright lets get to my objection. First I argue choice is dependent on at least four different factors of circumstances. For now I say they are environment, knowledge, physical condition, and motivation. For instance I could not choose to type on the computer this moment if I did not have a computer in front of me, so the environment is sufficient for typing at the computer to be an option of choice. I could not choose to type at this computer if I had no idea how to access this computer, so my knowledge is sufficient for typing at the computer to be an option of choice for me. I could not choose to type at this computer at the moment if I had no arms, and nothing to accommodate me, so my physical condition is sufficient for typing at the computer to be an option of choice for me. I could not choose to type at this computer If I had no reason or desire to do so, so my motivation is sufficient for typing at the computer to be an option of choice for me. The last one might be a little iffy at first so I will try to drive home this condition. I have a lot of knowledge of what might kill me, and my environment is such that I have access to lots of things that could kill me. My physical condition is also capable of causing myself death. So, why don't I choose to kill myself? Because I have more motivation to choose other options, like continuing to live. Those are the four main things choice is dependent on that I can think of right now.
Next knowledge, motivation, physical condition and environment are all influenced by each other. We get our motivation, and knowledge from our environment and physical condition. Also, our environment and physical condition are set at first but through knowledge and motivation and other circumstances they can also change and so our choices available to us and our ability to choose those choices constantly change.
So that being the case we are limited in choice to these factors, and choices will be ever changing when these factors change. So I will argue that either there is some sort of combination of circumstances of environment, knowledge, physical condition, and or motivation in some possible world that will lead a specific person to believe in god yet still keep whatever it is that still makes that person that person, whether it be soul or personality or character, ect. or there is not.
Option one: There is a possible world where circumstances are such that a non-believing person would believe in God and still be the same person. If that is the case then couldn't God make these worlds for everyone?
Option two: There is no such possible world under any circumstance where a non-believing person can believe in God and still be the same person. Then where is the freewill there? It seems that some people are made to disbelieve regardless of circumstance.
With that in mind how could such a God with the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and benevolence make a world where some people are limited by their circumstances and unable to believe and others are not. How could a God such like that condemn people that would have believed under different circumstances?
How could I be held accountable by God if God knows what worlds I would believe in him or not and he puts me in one he knew would be insufficient for me to believe? If God could not put me in any world of belief sufficient circumstances then how could I be held accountable to God if no matter what happened in my life in any possible world I would sin? Therefore If God has the properties I described and choice is as I described I cannot be held accountable by God for my disbelief.
Under this God's given properties and my analysis of choice freewill does not exist.
Note this is not really a direct argument from determinism because there could be many different worlds that would lead to a belief in god some far more likely than others. This is just an argument from the analysis of what choice is dependent on and the properties of an abrahmic God.
This has been an argument floating in my head for a while but I never really cared to take the time to flush it out. What do you think? Is it decent? Does it avoid the attacks arguments from determinism gets? Can I add something more to it? Anything need clarification? What are some possible counter arguments. Thanks.